DEBRIS.COMgood for a laugh, or possibly an aneurysm

Bruce Schneier’s essay on “profiling” injects some much-needed clarity to the debate: Terror Profiles By Computers Are Ineffective

He explains in clear terms what I’ve believed to be true but had no evidence to support: that profiling based on habits or, worse, race/culture/religious affiliation, doesn’t work. I can get caught up in the racist “us vs. them” mindset, in which I think, “I don’t like the looks of that guy; I hope somebody goes through his suitcase!” But it’s dumb, and contrary to the principles on which this country was founded. Also, as Schneier points out, it’s ineffective.

There’s a common belief — generally mistaken — that if we only had enough data we could pick terrorists out of crowds…

[But] identifiable future terrorists are rare, and innocents are common. No matter what patterns you’re looking for, far more innocents will match the patterns than terrorists because innocents vastly outnumber terrorists. So many that you might as well not bother.

In other words, profiling is a recipe for hassling innocent people. So while you might think profiling keeps you safe on the airplane, it’s much more likely to, instead, cause you stress and embarrassment and delay, and not very likely at all to keep you safe.

To illustrate the fallacy of profiling, Schneier closes his essay with a “modest proposal.”

Timothy McVeigh and John Allen Muhammad — one of the accused D.C. snipers — both served in the military. I think we need to put all U.S. ex-servicemen on a special watch list, because they obviously could be terrorists. I think we should flag them for “special screening” when they fly…

I’ve posted some favorite Schneier’s highlights in the past… fun to reread, fun to reflect on next time you’re stuck in line at a security checkpoint.